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Can Occupation Resulting from a War of SelfDefense Become Illegal?
Ariel Zemach*
Abstract
Illegal occupation gives rise to a duty of the occupant to
withdraw from the occupied territory immediately and
unconditionally. International law has long recognized the
illegality of occupation that results from an unlawful use of
force by the occupying state. An emerging approach among
international lawyers holds that occupation resulting from a
lawful use of force by a state, in self-defense, may also become
illegal. Proponents of this approach link the illegality of the
occupation to the occupant's violation of the prohibition on the
use of force or of the right of peoples to self-determination.
These violations result from the occupant's policies which
amount to de facto annexation of the occupied territory,
manifested in refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations to
end the occupation or in actions aimed at perpetuating the
occupation (e.g., enabling the settlement of the occupant's
citizens in the occupied territory). Arguments that such
conduct renders the occupation illegal have largely focused on
the occupation of Arab territories by Israel.
This article argues that the purview of the notion of illegal
occupation in international law does not extend to occupation
resulting from the lawful use of force by a state in self-defense
("lawfully created occupation"). The article reviews the various
theories presented in support of such an extension, but shows
that state practice does not support the existence of a rule of
customary international law providing that a lawfully created
occupation may subsequently become illegal.
The author subscribes to the view that a policy of de facto
annexation pursued by an occupant violates the right to selfdetermination, and possibly the prohibition on the use of force.
* Lecturer, Ono Academic College
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Such violation leads to legal consequences, but these do not
include the illegality of occupation. This article examines the
rules of international law that determine the legal
consequences of state conduct that violates international law,
and shows that these rules do not accommodate an extension of
the notion of illegal occupation to lawfully created occupation.
The article proceeds to argue that the introduction of a rule
of customary international law providing that a lawfully
created occupation may subsequently become illegal is
inadvisable because such a norm would be full of uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Might is right" is a proposition that has little appeal. This
sentiment seems to underlie an emerging approach among
international lawyers who hold that international law is never
silent on the question of whether or not an occupation is legal.'
At first, this position appears self-evident. The absence of rules
setting limits to the legality of occupation could be easily
perceived as a feature of past, best forgotten, international law,
which left states free to embark on a war of aggression 2 and
1. See, e.g. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since
1967, t 8, U.N. Doc. A/62/275 (Aug. 17, 2007) (by John Dugard) (citing "the
argument that Israel's occupation has over the years become tainted with
illegality," the Special Rapporteur proposed "that the International Court of
Justice be asked to give a further advisory opinion[] on the legal consequences
of prolonged occupation," and contemplated whether the Israeli occupation has
"ceased to be a lawful regime, particularly in respect of'measures aimed at the
,occupant's own interests."'); see generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION

349 (2012); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-

DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 55, 99 (1995); Orna BenNaftali, Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: Framing the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 551, 551-56 (2005);
Nehal Bhuta, New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of a Jus Post Bellum of
Constitutional Transformation, 60 U. TORONTO L. J. 799, 810 (2010);
Salvatore Fabio Nicolosi, The Law of Military Occupation and the Role of De
Jure and De Facto Sovereignty, 31 POLISH Y. B. INT'L L. 165, 184 (2011); Yael
Ronen, Illegal Occupation and Its Consequences, 41 ISR. L. REV. 201, 210, 218
(2008); Timothy William Waters, Plucky Little Russia: Misreading the
Georgian War Through the DistortingLens of Aggression, 49 STAN. J. INT'L L.
176, 198-99 (2013).
2.

See

YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,

AGGRESSION

AND SELF-DEFENSE

78

(2011) ("[I]n the nineteen century, the predominant conviction was that every
State had a right - namely, an interest protected by international law - to
embark upon war whenever it pleased.") (citation omitted).
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considered the use of force a legitimate means of acquiring title
to territory. 3
An extensive body of international legal rules, referred to
as the international law of occupation, regulates the conduct of
an occupant during an occupation. But commentators caution
that restricting the interaction between international law and
occupation to the branch of international humanitarian law,
without regulating the legality of occupation itself, would
"generate ... troubling results: international law becomes an
apology for power, and the very phenomenon of occupation is
excluded from a critical legal review. Such exclusion is an
invitation for excessive power."4 In other words, leaving a state
free to maintain an occupation as long as it has the military
means to do so would bring international law dangerously close
to "might is right."
International law has long recognized the illegality of
occupation resulting from an unlawful use of force by the
occupying state.5 The illegality of such occupation stems from
the general obligation of states under customary international
law to cease internationally wrongful conduct and eliminate its
consequences. The novelty of recent illegal occupation theories
concerns the extension of the notion of illegal occupation to
certain occupations resulting from the lawful use of force by a
state in self-defense. Commentators advocating such extension
have largely focused on the occupation of Arab territories by
Israel since 1967, which is currently the only prolonged
occupation resulting, by most accounts, from a war of selfdefense.8 This article refers to an occupation resulting from the

3. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 271 (2009) ("In the past, a treaty of cession could have the

function of rubber-stamping the successful results of a war of aggression.")
(footnote omitted).
4. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 553 (footnote omitted).
5.

See infra notes 49-65, and accompanying text.

6. See infra notes 122-131, and accompanying text.
7. See sources cited supra note 1.
8. See e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 206-07; THOMAS M. FRANCK,
RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS
105 (2002); GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS 30 (2000); GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON
TRIAL 20-21 (1988); Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing
the International Ban on Biological and Chemical Weapons Through
Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization,20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 477, 491-92

(1998-1999) ("The United Nations appeared to recognize the right of
anticipatory self-defense when Israel launched a preemptory airstrike against
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lawful use of force in self-defense as "lawfully created
occupation," and unless otherwise stated, it refers to the notion
of illegal occupation only with regard to such occupation.
It is widely agreed that the phenomenon of occupation is
not illegal per se. 9 Most proponents of the notion of illegal
occupation link the illegality of an occupation to an occupant's
violation of either the prohibition on the use of force or of the
right of peoples to self-determination. 10 Such violations result
from the occupant's policies which amount to de facto
annexation of the occupied territory, manifested in refusal to
engage in good-faith negotiations toward ending the occupation
or in actions aimed at perpetuating the occupation (e.g.,
enabling the settlement of the occupant's citizens in the
occupied territory)."
Occupation is defined under customary international law
as "effective control of a power (be it one or more states or an
international organization, such as the United Nations) over a
territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without
the volition of the sovereign of that territory." 2 The test for the
existence of occupation is thus a factual one. 3 An occupation
ends whenever the foreign power no longer exercises effective
control over the territory. 4 The illegality of occupation imposes
Egypt, precipitating the 1967 'Six Day War.' Many countries supported

Israel's right to conduct defensive strikes prior to armed attack and draft
resolutions condemning the Israeli action were soundly defeated in the

Security Council and the General Assembly."). But see John Quigley, The Oslo

Accords: InternationalLaw and the Israeli-PalestinianPeace Agreement, 25
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 73, 81 (2001) ("Israel's claim of self-defense in
the 1967 war is factually implausible.").
9. See sources cited supra note 1; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 2
(Observing that "international law - far from stigmatizing belligerent
occupation with illegality - recognizes its frequency and regulates its
application.").
10. See infra Part II.
11.

See BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 245-46; Ben-Naftali et al., supra

note 1, at 579, 601-05.
12. BENVENISTI, supra note 1,at 43. This definition derives from Article
42 of the Hague Regulations, which states that "territory is considered
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.
The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised." See Annex to the Hague Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2295.
13. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Factors in War to Peace
Transitions, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 843, 845 (2004); Adam Roberts, The
End of Occupation:Iraq 2004, 54 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 27, 47 (2005).
14. See BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 56.
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a duty on the occupant to terminate its effective control over
the territory. Customary international law requires a state
responsible for an internationally wrongful act to first cease the
violation. 15 Because in cases of illegal occupation "the violation
goes to the very existence of the occupation, the cessation of
violation necessarily means termination of the occupation...
an illegal occupation must, under the general laws of state
responsibility, be terminated immediately and without prior
negotiations." 6
The sway of the notion of illegal occupation lies in the
elimination of the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate interests of the occupant. A policy aimed at
affecting de facto annexation of an occupied territory clearly
advances the latter. 7 But circumstances underlying a lawful
use of force in self-defense which results in an occupation also
give rise to a set of national security interests that an occupant
may legitimately promote by maintaining the occupation and
negotiating the terms of its termination. 8 The determination
that an occupation is illegal renders such interests legally
immaterial. Illegality of the occupation imposes, quite simply, a
duty on the occupant to withdraw immediately and
unconditionally, "without prior negotiations," 9 regardless of
grave risks to its national security and to the safety of its
civilian population, which may result from such withdrawal.20
The main legal question arising in relation to the notion of
illegal occupation may thus be formulated as follows: does an
occupant that pursues illegitimate interests with regard to de
facto annexation of the occupied territory thereby forfeit its
otherwise legitimate interests concerning the terms of ending
the occupation? What does the occupant stand to lose - in the
currency of legitimate interests - by attempting to perpetuate

15. See Oliver Corten, The Obligation of Cessation, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 545 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon

Olleson eds., 2010); infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
16. Ronen, supra note 1, at 228 (footnote omitted).
17. See BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 6 ("The foundation upon which the
entire law of occupation is based is the principle of inalienability of
sovereignty through unilateral action of a foreign power, whether through the
actual or the threatened use of force, or in any way unauthorized by the
sovereign. Effective control by foreign military force can never bring about by
itself a valid transfer of sovereignty.").
18. See infra notes 143-169 and accompanying text.
19. Ronen, supra note 1, at 228.
20. See infra Part IV(B) for a discussion of these risks.
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the occupation?
This article argues that the purview of the notion of illegal
occupation in customary international law does not extend to
lawfully created occupation. The author subscribes to the view
that a policy of de facto annexation pursued by an occupant
violates the right to self-determination, and possibly the
prohibition on the use of force. Such violation carries legal
consequences, but those consequences do not characterize the
occupation as illegal.
Part II reviews the various theories underlying the notion
of illegal occupation. Part III shows that state practice does not
support the existence of a rule of customary international law
providing that a prolonged occupation resulting from a lawful
use of force may become illegal.
Part IV examines the rules of customary international law
regarding the responsibility of states for internationally
wrongful acts ("State Responsibility Rules"), which determine
the legal consequences of state conduct that violates
international law. Analysis of State Responsibility Rules
demonstrates that violations of the right to self-determination
and of the prohibition on the use of force, manifested in conduct
by the occupant that amounts to de facto annexation of the
occupied territory, do not give rise to a duty of the occupant to
withdraw from the occupied territory. In other words, State
Responsibility Rules do not accommodate an extension of the
notion of illegal occupation to lawfully created occupation. This
conclusion relies, among others, on a review of the interests an
occupant may legitimately pursue in maintaining the
occupation and negotiating the terms of its termination.
Part V argues that a rule of customary international law,
which provides for the illegality of certain lawfully created
occupations, is undesirable as a matter of lex ferenda, because
application of such a norm would be heavily burdened by
uncertainty and greatly increase indeterminacy in the law.

II. THEORIES OF ILLEGAL OCCUPATION
The norms most often invoked as basis for the illegality of
certain lawfully created occupations are the prohibition on the
use of force by states and the right of peoples to selfdetermination, both considered peremptory norms of customary
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international law.2' Submitting that "an occupation regime that
refuses earnestly to contribute to efforts to reach a peaceful
solution should be considered illegal," 22 Eyal Benvenisti
explains:
The occupant has a duty under international law to
conduct negotiations in good faith for a peaceful
solution. It would seem that an occupant which
proposes
unreasonable
conditions,
or otherwise
obstructs negotiations for peace for the purpose of
retaining control over the occupied territory, could be
considered a violator of international law.23
This violation of international law concerns the prohibition
on the use of force. Hence, Benvenisti proposes to "view the
continued rule of the recalcitrant occupant as an aggression."24
Bad-faith efforts on the part of an occupant to prolong the
occupation, which violate the prohibition on the use of force and
therefore taint the occupation with illegality, may also include
"any measure aimed at creating new hurdles to the
negotiations by changing the status quo in the occupied areas
(for example, by enabling the migration of its own citizens into
the occupied territory").25
According to Benvenisti, international law allows a state to
occupy foreign territory as an extension of the self-defense
exception to the prohibition on the use of force.26 Hence, "the
subjection of the right to self-defense to the necessity
requirement.., could imply that the occupation becomes an
act of aggression when it no longer serves the initial purpose of

21. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
189, 212 (the International Court
of Justice recognized the prohibition on the use of force as a peremptory
norm); DINSTEIN, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 105
(discussing the peremptory nature of the prohibition on the use of force); Peter

G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious

Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 11-12, n.29 (2008)
(observing

that

"[i]n

the

opinion

of many jurists

and

writers,

self-

determination is not only a binding rule of international law, but enjoys the
status of a peremptory norm (jus cogens)."); see generally CASSESE, supra note
Error!Bookmark not defined., at 133-40.
22. BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 245.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 349.
25. Id. at 246.
26. Id. at 17.
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defending against the aggressor who has been defeated."27
Benvenisti supports this construction of the prohibition on
the use of force by citing the right of peoples to selfdetermination,2 8 which holds that all peoples are entitled to
"freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development." 29 Applied to a
people under occupation, this right is incompatible with a view
that does not limit the liberty of an occupant to prolong the
occupation. 30
Antonio Cassese maintains that prolonged occupations
amount to a violation of the prohibition on the use of force,
which in turn gives rise to a violation of the right to selfdetermination.3' Cassese explains that any military occupation
amounts to "grave breach" of the right to self-determination
unless "it is justified by Article 51 of the UN Charter [i.e., the
self-defense exception to the prohibition on the use of force A.Z.J and, therefore, being restricted to the need to repel an act
,,32
of aggression, is limited in duration. Hence, according to
Cassese the illegality of prolonged occupations is rooted in both
the prohibition on the use of force and in the right to selfdetermination.
Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal Gross and Keren Michaeli
advance a notion of illegal occupation that relies on a wellestablished principle of the international law of occupation
concerning the temporary nature of occupation. 33 It is widely
27. Id.

28. Id. at 349.
29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1(1), Dec.

19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
30. See BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 349.
31. CASSESE, supra note 1, at 55, 99.
32. Id. at 55; see also Bhuta, supra note 1, at 812 ("A straightforward

extension of the concept of external self-determination is that it is violated by
military occupation or other forms of 'alien domination,' except where the use
of force was justified under article 51 of the UN Charter and the occupation is
restricted to the time period and extent necessary to repel aggression.").
33. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 592. Regarding the temporary
nature of occupation, see generally BENVENISTI, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 6; INT'L COM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY
ON THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF

CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 275 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) ("The

occupation of territory in wartime is essentially a temporary, de facto

situation."); Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195,
236-37 (2005); Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying
the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 582 (2006)

(observing the temporary nature of occupation). The Supreme Court of Israel
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agreed that the temporary nature of occupation affects the
duties and privileges of an occupant during occupation. 34 BenNaftali, Gross, and Michaeli argue, however, that the purview
of the temporality principle extends
also to the question of the
35
legality of the occupation itself.
This argument relies on two fundamental principles of the
law of occupation. The first is the principle of the inalienability
of sovereignty through actual or threatened use of force, which
holds, inter alia, that sovereignty and title in an occupied
territory are not vested in the occupant but rather in the
population under occupation. 6 The second principle holds that
an occupation is a form of trust and that "in view of the
principle of self-determination, the people under occupation are
the beneficiaries of this trust." 37 Ben-Naftali, Gross, and
Michaeli subscribe to the view, espoused by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), that the "ultimate objective" 38 of an
occupation as a form of trust is to promote the realization of the
right to self-determination of peoples under occupation. 39 BenNaftali, Gross, and Michaeli contend that these two basic
principles of the law of occupation "generate the third principle
of occupation: its temporality. Indeed,
the very essence of
40
occupation is founded on this idea."
Applying the constraint of temporality as a limit on the
legality of occupation, Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli argue
has recognized the temporary nature of occupation. See Coop. Soc'y Lawfully
Registered in the Judea and Samaria Region v. Commander of the IDF Forces
in the Judea and Samaria Region et al., HCJ 393/82, 37(4) PD 785, 802-07
[1984] (Isr.), translated in 14 ISR. Y. HUM. RTS. 301 (1984) [hereinafter
Judea and Samaria].
34. See e.g., Judea and Samaria, supra note 33, at 802-07 (holding that
the temporary nature of the occupation bears on the scope of the occupant's
executive and legislative powers); BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 6; Roberts,
Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 33, at 582 ("The assumption
that, the occupant's role being temporary, any alteration of the existing order

in occupied territory should be minimal lies at the heart of the provisions on
military occupation in the laws of war.").
35. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 555, 592-605.
36. See id. at 554; see also BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 6 (describing the

principle of inalienability of sovereignty through unilateral action of a foreign
power as "the foundation upon which the entire law of occupation is based").
37. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 555.
38. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136,
88
[hereinafter Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall].
39. See id.; Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 577.

40. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 592.
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that "the concrete time limit is determined by the legal
construct of 'reasonable time,' deriving from the legal principle
of 'reasonableness.' 4' The "reasonable time" limit does not
necessarily preclude prolonged occupations. Rather, "what is a
reasonable time for an action depends on the nature, purpose,
and circumstances of the action. 42 The purpose of occupation as
a form of trust is to bring about, through peaceful means, a
political change that would end the occupation and realize the
right to self-determination.4 3 If an occupant operates over a
prolonged period of time contrary to this purpose, the
prolongation of the occupation constitutes a violation of the
"reasonable time" limitation, rendering the existence of the
occupation illegal.44
According to Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli, "the most
relevant circumstances to be examined in this respect are
whether the occupying power has annexed the occupied
territory or has otherwise indicated an intention to retain its
presence there indefinitely." 4 Concluding that the policy
pursued by Israel with regard to the Palestinian occupied
territory, consisting mainly in the establishment of Israeli
settlements and the construction of a wall separating certain
parts of the occupied territory from others, suggests such an
intention, 46 Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli argue that the
Israeli occupation "has exceeded its reasonable duration" 47 and
should therefore be considered illegal.48

41. Id. at 599 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. (footnote omitted).
43. See id. at 600 ("It is clear that the purpose of the regime of occupation
is to manage the situation in a manner designed to bring about political
change and to generate a resumption of the normal order of international
society. Relevant international norms further decree that this change should
come about by peaceful means and realize the principle of selfdetermination.") (footnotes omitted).
44. Id. at 605.
45. Id. at 601.
46. See id. at 601, 605.
47. Id. at 604.
48. Id. at 605.
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III. DOES STATE PRACTICE SUPPORT THE NOTION
OF ILLEGAL OCCUPATION?
A. OCCUPATION RESULTING FROM AN UNLAWFUL USE OF
FORCE

International law clearly recognizes the notion of illegal
occupation created through an unlawful use of force. The
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, 49 adopted by
consensus by the UN General Assembly, states that "the
territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation
resulting from the use of force in contravention of the
provisions of the Charter."5 0 Similarly, an amendment to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by
consensus in 2010, provides that one of the acts that qualify as
an "act of aggression" is "the invasion or attack by the armed
forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any
military occupation,5 1 however temporary, resulting from such
invasion or attack."
The UN Security Council has thus noted the illegality of
the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990,52 widely
perceived as the result of an illegal use of force on the part of
Iraq.5 3 The ICJ concluded that the occupation of the Congolese
province of Ituri by Uganda, which resulted from an unlawful
use of force on the part of Uganda, 4 "violated the principle of
49. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. Supp. No.
28, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
50. Id.
10. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") held that this
General Assembly resolution is indicative of customary international law. See
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
188, 191 (June 27).
51. Resolution RC/Res.6 of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute,
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art.
Sbis(2),
June
11,
2010,
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2010/CN.651.2010-Eng.pdf.
52. S.C. Res. 674,
8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (Oct. 29, 1990) (The UN
Security Council warned Iraq that "it is liable for any loss, damage or injury
arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and
corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by
Iraq").
53. S.C. Res. 661, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
54. Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116,
165, 171 (Dec. 19, 2005); see also Ronen, supra
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non-use of force in international relations and the principle of
non-intervention. , 55 Similarly, the European Court of Human
Rights has recently termed the occupation of Northern Cyprus
by Turkey, widely perceived as resulting from an unlawful
invasion of the Turkish army of Cyprus, 56 an "illegal
occupation.
International law has recognized the notion of illegal
occupation also regarding occupation that resulted from a
state's refusal to withdraw its military forces from a territory
over which it lost legal title. In view of UN General Assembly
and Security Council resolutions that terminated South
Africa's mandate over Namibia, the ICJ determined in its
1971 Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia that the
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia amounted to
occupation.5 9 Implying that the occupation was illegal, the ICJ
stated that "by maintaining the present illegal situation, and
occupying the Territory without title, South Africa incurs
international responsibilities ....
Similarly, the refusal of Portugal to terminate its colonial
rule over Guinea-Bissau in the wake of the latter's declaration
of independence has prompted the UN General Assembly to
adopt Resolution 3061 (1973), which "strongly condemns the
policies of the Government of Portugal in perpetuating its
illegal occupation of certain sectors of the Republic of GuineaBissau."6 '
note 1, at 224 ("[T]he occupation of Ituri is a simple case of aggressive use of
force.").

55. Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo, supra note 54, 345.
56. Thomas D. Grant, Review Essay: Martin van Creveld, The Rise and
Decline of the State, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 309, 318 (2000) ("The Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), declared as such in 1984, came into
being through a chain of events beginning in July 1974 and connected with
use of force by Turkey. The use of force has been widely, if not universally,
characterized as illegal."); Elena Katselli, The Ankara Agreement, Turkey and
the EU, 55 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 705, 714 (2006).
57.
2010).

Demopoulos v. Turkey, App. no. 46113/99, paras. 94, 96 (March 1,

58. G.A. Res. 2145 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Oct. 27, 1966); S.C. Res. 264,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/264 (Mar. 20, 1969); S.C. Res. 276, U.N. Doc. S/RES/276
(Jan. 30, 1970).

59. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21, 1971).
60. Id. 118.
61. G.A. Res. 3061 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess. Supp. No. 30, U.N.
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Yael Ronen correctly observed that:
[I]n Namibia and Guinea-Bissau... the foreign forces
(of South Africa and Portugal, respectively) had initially
exercised effective control over the territory under an
internationally-recognized title (colonial holding by
Portugal and a mandate by the League of Nations to
South Africa). The two territories became occupied once
the controlling states lost the titles they had held. 2
The occupations of Namibia and Guinea-Bissau did not
result from foreign military invasion. However, those
occupations were created through illegal use of force consisting
in the refusal on the part of South Africa and Portugal to
withdraw their military forces from the territory upon loss of
title.63 Such circumstances are indistinguishable from an
occupation resulting from the refusal of a foreign army,
initially invited to a territory by the legitimate sovereign, to
withdraw from that territory after the invitation has expired. 4
International law considers such refusal an act of aggression. 65
A review of state practice reveals, however, that the
purview of the notion of illegal occupation in customary
international law is limited to occupations resulting from an
unlawful use of force on the part of the occupant; it does not
extend to occupations created as a result of the use of force in
self-defense by the occupying state.
B. OCCUPATION RESULTING FROM A LAWFUL USE OF FORCE

Pronouncing the traditional approach of international law
toward lawfully created occupations, Oppenheim observed:
Doe. A/9030 (Nov. 2, 1973).
62. Ronen, supra note 1, at 215.

63. Id. at 216 (regarding the cases of Namibia and Guinea-Bissau, "the
prohibition on the use of force covers not only entry into a territory, but also
failure to leave it").
64. Id. at 216, n. 64.

65. Resolution RC/Res.6, supra note 51, art. Sbis(2) (providing that one of
the acts that qualify as an "act of aggression" is "the use of armed forces of one
State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of
the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the
termination of the agreement"); see also Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res.
3314 (XXIX),
3(e) of annex, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974); DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 202.
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If a belligerent succeeds in occupying the whole, or even
a part, of enemy territory, he has realized a very
important aim of warfare. He can now not only use the
resources of the enemy country for military purposes,
but can also keep it for the time being as a pledge of his
military success, and thereby impress upon the enemy
66
the necessity of submitting to terms of peace.
Rosalyn Higgins, a former judge at the ICJ, similarly noted
that "there is nothing in either the [U.N.] Charter or general
international law which leads one to suppose that military
occupation, pending a peace treaty, is illegal."6 7 Former Israeli
Chief Justice, Meir Shamgar, also rejected the notion of "illegal
occupation," stating that "pending an alternative political or
military solution [occupation] ... could, from a legal point of
view, continue indefinitely. 8 Other commentators share this
view.6 9 A review of conventional international law reveals no
treaty provision that refutes these statements of law.
Proponents
of the
"illegal
occupation"
notion
have
acknowledged that "neither the Hague Regulations nor the
Fourth Geneva Convention limits the duration of the
occupation or requires the occupant to restore the territories to
the sovereign before a peace treaty is signed."70
Although the practice of the UN Security Council ("SC")
may at times be inconsistent with norms of customary

66. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
BENVENISTI, supranote 1, at 245).

LAW 432 (7th ed.

1948) (cited in

67. Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of InternationalLaw in the Settlement of
Disputes by the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1970).
68. Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military
Government -

The

Initial Stage, in

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

IN THE

TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980 - THE LEGAL ASPECTS 13,

43 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982).

69. DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 2 ("[A] myth surrounding the legal regime

of belligerent occupation is that it is, or becomes in time, inherently illegal
under international law."); YORAM DINSTEIN, The International Legal
Dimensions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, in ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS 137,
150 (Alfred E. Kellermann, Kurt Siehr & Talia Einhorn eds., 1998) ("While

belligerent occupation does not transfer title (sovereignty), it does mean that
the occupying Power has a temporary right of possession (which can continue

as long as peace is not concluded)."); Michael Curtis, InternationalLaw and
the Territories, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 457, 464-65 (1991) ("Israel is legally

entitled to remain in the territory it now holds and to protect its security
interests therein until new boundaries are drawn in a peace settlement.").
70. BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 245.
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international law, 71 it is often perceived as evidence of such
norms. 72 SC resolutions do not provide any support for the view
that the notion of "illegal occupation" may extend to occupation
resulting from a lawful use of force.73 Indeed, the practice of the
SC points to the contrary.
SC Resolution 242 (1967) adopted in the wake of the 1967
war that resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank,
Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and Sinai peninsula, tied Israel's
withdrawal from occupied territories to the realization of the
challenging aim of establishing "a just and lasting peace." 74 It
has been noted that upon its adoption Resolution 242 was
widely accepted as being consistent with the traditional
position of international law on occupation, pronounced by
Oppenheim, 7 "as it linked the withdrawal from occupied
,,76
territories with the establishment of a just and lasting peace.
The language of Resolution 242 seems inconsistent at least
with the theory of illegal occupation advanced by Cassese,
which holds that an occupation resulting from a lawful use of
force in self-defense may not continue after the armed attack
against the occupant has been repelled.77
Moreover, a series of SC resolutions suggest unwillingness
on the part of the SC to link attempts on the part of an
occupant to annex the occupied territory to the notion of "illegal

71. On the legal limitations on Security Council (SC) powers, see Joy
Gordon, The Sword of Damocles: Revisiting the Question of Whether the United
Nations Security Council is Bound by InternationalLaw, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L.
605 (2012).

72. The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in Former Yugoslavia Since
1991,
133-34 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)
(relying on SC resolutions as evidence of customary international law); Colin
Warbrick, The United Nations System: A Place for Criminal Courts?, 5
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237 (1995).
73. Robbie Sabel, The Palestine Question in InternationalLaw, 42 ISR. L.
REV. 628, 631 (2009) (reviewing VICTOR KATTAN, THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008)) ("It is noteworthy that the UN Security Council,

over a period of some forty years, has never designated the Israeli occupation
as illegal.").
74. S.C. Res. 242, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967).
75. See supra note 66.
76. BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 245; see also Curtis, supra note 69, at
492 ("[Resolution 242] does not require withdrawal by Israel until the
establishment of a just and lasting peace through negotiations.").
77. CASSESE, supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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occupation." In June 1967, the Israeli Government issued an
order expanding the application of "Israeli law, jurisdiction and
administration" to East Jerusalem, which is part of the
Palestinian occupied territories.7 ' The order also placed East
Jerusalem under the existing Israeli municipality of (West)
Jerusalem. In 1980, the Israeli legislature enacted "Basic
Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel," which provided that80
"Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel."
Although Israel did not present those measures as annexation,
"internationally... these measures were understood as
attempts to 81 annex East Jerusalem, and were criticized
accordingly."

In response to the 1967 act, the SC adopted Resolution
252, which affirmed "that acquisition of territory by military
conquest is inadmissible" 82 and considered "that all legislative
and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel...
which tend to change the status of Jerusalem are invalid."83
Responding to the 1980 Basic Law, the SC adopted Resolution
478, reaffirming "the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory
by force." 4 The SC censured the enactment of the Basic Law "in86
85
the strongest terms" as a "violation of international law."

But although the SC viewed Israel's legislative measures as an
attempt to acquire territory by force 87 (i.e., to annex East
Jerusalem), neither SC resolution referred to the occupation of
East Jerusalem as illegal.
A similar legislative measure was taken by Israel in
relation to the Syrian territory occupied by Israel in 1967, the
Golan Heights. In 1981, Israel enacted the Golan Heights Law,
which provides that "the law, jurisdiction and administration of

78. Law and Administration Order, 5727-1967, SH 499 (1967) (Isr.).
79. Id.

80. Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, 5740-1980, SH 980 (1980)

(Isr.).
81. BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 205; see also Adam Roberts, Prolonged
Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J.

INT'L L. 44, 60 (1990) ("East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights have been
brought directly under Israeli law, by acts that amount to annexation.").
82. S.C. Res. 252, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/252 (May 21, 1968).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.

2.

S.C. Res. 478, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980).
Id. 11.
Id. 2.
Id., preamble.
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the state shall apply to the area of the Golan Heights."88 This
legislative measure was widely perceived by the international
community as amounting to annexation of the Golan Heights,
although Israel did not present it as such 9 In response to this
legislative measure, the SC passed Resolution 497 (1981),
declaring that "the Israeli decision to impose its laws,
jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan
Heights is null and void" 90 and once more reaffirming the
inadmissibility of the "acquisition of territory by force." 91 The
notion that a conduct by an occupant aimed at the "acquisition
of territory by force" 92 bears on the legality of the occupation
itself finds no support in the language of the Resolution,
however.
The SC seems to have taken the view that the
unlawfulness of a policy aimed at annexing an occupied
territory is limited to the manifestations of such policy (i.e., the
legislative measures taken by Israel) and does not extend to the
occupation itself. This approach arguably pertains also to a
policy of veiled annexation manifested in efforts to establish
facts on the ground, or in refusal on the part of an occupant to
engage in good-faith negotiations aimed at ending the
occupation.
In contrast with SC practice, several UN General
Assembly resolutions specifically addressing the Israeli
occupation of Arab territories referred to the occupation as
"illegal."93 Similarly, General Assembly resolutions condemned
"Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories, in violation of
the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of

88. Golan Heights Law, 5742-1981, 36 LSI 7(1981-1982) (Isr.).
89. Asher Maoz, The Application of Israeli Law to the Golan Heights is
Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 355, 384-89 (1994) (reviewing the response

of the international community to the Israeli legislation).
90. S.C. Res. 497,
91. Id., preamble.

1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/497 (Dec. 17, 1981).

92. Id.
93. General Assembly Resolution 32/20 on the situation in the Middle
East, adopted in 1977, pronounced deep concern "that the Arab territories
occupied since 1967 have continued, for more than ten years, to be under
illegal Israeli occupation and that the Palestinian people, after three decades,
are still deprived of the exercise of their inalienable national rights." G.A. Res.

32/20, pmbl. 4 & operative 1 1, U.N. GAOR, 32nd. Sess., Supp. No. 45, U.N.
Doc. AIRES/32/20 (Nov. 25, 1977). Subsequent resolutions include virtually
identical language. See G.A. Res. 33/29, pmbl.
4, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess.,
Supp. No. 45, U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/29 (Dec. 7, 1978); G.A. Res. 34/70, pmbl.
5, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. AIRES/34/70 (Dec. 6, 1979).
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international law, and repeated resolutions of the United
Nations .... 94 One of the resolutions condemning the Israeli
occupation as illegal also cited "those principles of international
law which prohibit the occupation.., of territory by the use of
force and which consider any military occupation, however
temporary, or any forcible annexation
of such territory, or part
95
thereof, as an act of aggression."

These resolutions provide little support for extending the
notion of "illegal occupation" to lawfully created occupations for
two reasons. First, it is highly doubtful that the resolutions
reflect a perception of the Israeli occupation as lawfully
created. It has been observed that the resolutions "should
probably be read as a reflection of the position of Arab and
other states, namely that Israel had acted aggressively in
1967. "96 Second, to the extent that the resolutions represent
state practice that pertains to lawfully created occupations,
such practice carries little weight in ascertaining the state of
customary international law.
It is widely agreed that in themselves, UN General
Assembly resolutions are not legally binding upon states.9 7 But
there is an unsettled debate concerning the weight of General

94.

G.A. Res. 32/20, supra note 93,

1. For General Assembly resolutions

with similar language, see G.A. Res. 45/83A,
5, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doe. A/RES/45/83A, at 35 (Dec. 13, 1990); G.A. Res.
44140A, 5, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doe. A/RES/44140A, at
42 (Dec. 4, 1989); G.A. Res. 43/54A,

5, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49,

U.N. Doe. A/RES/43/54A, at 57 (Dec. 6, 1988); G.A. Res. 40/168A,
5, U.N.
GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doe. A/RES/40/168A, at 58 (Dec. 16,
1985); G.A. Res. 36/226A,

1, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doe.

A/RES/36/226A, at 48 (Dec. 17, 1981); G.A. Res. 34/70, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 21; G.A. Res. 33/29, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 18; G.A. Res. 3414 (XXX), 2, U.N. GAOR, 30th
Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doe. A/10034, at 7 (Dec. 5, 1975).

95. G.A. Res. 3414, supra note 94, pmbl. 2.
96. Ronen, supra note 1, at 218.
97. South West Africa Voting Procedure Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. 67,
at 115 (H. Lauterpacht, J., concurring) (stating that while "decisions of the
General Assembly are endowed with full legal effect in some spheres of U.N.
activity.., generally they are not legally binding upon the Members of the
United Nations... [but] are in the nature of recommendations."); Scott W.
Lyons, Ineffective Amnesty: The Legal Impact on Negotiating the End to

Conflict, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 799, 810, n. 59 (2012); Stephen M.
Schwebel,

The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on

Customary InternationalLaw, 73 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 301, 301 (1979)
("[T]he General Assembly of the United Nations lacks legislative powers. Its
resolutions are not, generally speaking, binding on the States Members of the
United Nations or binding in international law at large.").
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Assembly resolutions as evidence of customary international
law or as state practice contributing to the formation of
customary law. 98 "Customary international law results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from
a sense of legal obligation[,J" 99 referred to as opinio juris. A
United States Court of Appeals has concluded that resolutions
of the General Assembly "are not proper sources of customary
international law because they are merely aspirational and
were never intended to be binding on member States of the
United Nations." 010
By contrast, most commentators take the view that
General Assembly resolutions can possibly serve as evidence of
customary international law to the extent that they are
indicative of opinio juris.1°1 According to this view, the UN
General Assembly "serves as the most convenient forum within
which countries assert their views about the wide range of
world events-assertions that can directly contribute to both

the

objective and subjective criteria founding customary

international law." 102 This view finds support in ICJ
jurisprudence, which regarded certain resolutions adopted by

98. For a review of this debate, see Schwebel, supra note 97.
99. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102(2) (1987).
100. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Co., 414 F.3d 233, 259 (2d Cir. 2003); see also
Jose A. Cabranes, Customary InternationalLaw: What it is and What it is Not,
22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 143, 150 (2011) ("It is tempting to look to
statements by the United Nations General Assembly or other international
agencies or conferences for expressions of customary international law. Yet...
repeated adoption of such non-binding resolutions of international
organizations cannot, by miraculous alchemy, transform those resolutions into
"law"-in international affairs, as in basic arithmetic, one hundred times zero,
is, alas, zero.").
101. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 5-7 (1963); Lyons,

supra note 97, at 810, n. 59 ("Most commentators do not suggest that General
Assembly resolutions create binding norms of international law but instead
suggest that they may possibly be evidence of opiniojuris."); David A. Koplow,
ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of AntiSatellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1187, 1231 (2009) ("A UNGA
resolution-depending on how it is worded, what the drafters' intentions are,
and how overwhelmingly it is supported-can constitute strong evidence of the
existence and content of a putative CIL [customary international law] rule.");
Michael Byers, The Shifting Foundations of InternationalLaw: A Decade of
Forceful Measures Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 21, 31 (2002) ("[M]any
non-industrialized states and a significant number of writers have asserted
that resolutions are important forms of practice which are potentially creative,
or at least indicative, of rules of customary international law.").
102. Koplow, supra note 101.
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the General Assembly as evidence of customary international

law. 10 3

Yet "it is generally agreed that the legal effect varies with

the intent, nature and content of the [General Assembly]
resolution

and

also

with

the

nature

of

the

support

received .... 4 Hence, the weight of a General Assembly
resolution as evidence of the existence and content of a rule of
customary international law depends largely on "how
overwhelmingly it is supported." 0 5 A review of the voting
records shows that none of the Western democracies supported
the resolutions asserting the illegality of the Israeli
occupation. 106 Although adoption by consensus is not a
necessary requirement for a General Assembly resolution to be
regarded as evidence of customary international law, 0 7 denial
of support for a resolution by a significant segment of the
international community substantially detracts from its weight

as such evidence.
The weight attributed to General Assembly resolutions

103. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14,
188, 191.
104. C.F. Amerasinghe, Issues of Compensation for the Taking of Alien
Property in the Light of Recent Cases and Practice, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 22,
34, n. 48 (1992).
105. Koplow, supra note 101, at 1231. Indeed, the General Assembly
resolution adopting the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, which was
recognized by the ICJ as evidence of customary international law, was adopted
by the General Assembly by consensus. See Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. 14, 191.
106. See General Assembly of the United Nations, Voting Records,
available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp. It is noteworthy
that states initially supporting such resolutions have subsequently revised
their position upon transition from a totalitarian regime to democracy. These
states include Spain and Eastern European states. This is evident after
studying G.A. Res. 45/83A, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
35; G.A. Res. 44/40A, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 42; G.A.
Res. 43/54A, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 57; G.A. Res.
40/168A, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 58; G.A. Res.
36/226A, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 48; G.A. Res. 34/70,
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 21; G.A. Res. 33/29, supra
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 18; G.A. Res. 32/20, supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., operative
1, at 24; G.A. Res. 3414 (XXX),
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 7. See UNITED NATIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFO. SYS., Voting Records - Keyword Search Indexes,
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=142281M90C5A3.33614&
profile=voting&lang=eng&logout=true&startover=true
(search
by
"UN
Resolution Symbol"; type in UN Resolution Symbol for the UN Resolution of
interest; then click the red circle with the white arrow to the right of the
search box).
107. HIGGINS, supra note 101, at 6.
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also depends on "what the drafters' intentions are .... ,,1o8 It
has been observed that the political nature of the General
Assembly "reduces even the capacity to evaluate the strength of
opinio juris shown in the resolutions." 01 9 The nature of a
General Assembly resolution as a product of an intense
political controversy significantly diminishes its weight as
evidence of customary international law. There can be little
doubt that such circumstances underlie the General Assembly
resolutions characterizing the Israeli occupation as "illegal," as
manifested in the divide between Western and non-Western
states, the latter commanding a majority within the General
Assembly. 110
Official statements on the part of states constitute another
form of state practice contributing to customary international
law and indicative of it."' Official statements on the part of
Western states concerning the Israeli occupation of the
Palestinian territories, including statements condemning
Israel's illegal settlement activity, do not refer to the Israeli
occupation as "illegal." A recent statement on the part of the
European Union (EU), speaking for twenty-eight member
states, is instructive. In June 2013, the European Commission
adopted a Notice containing guidelines regarding the
ineligibility of Israeli entities located within the territories
occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes, and
instruments funded by the EU. 112 The notice

financial

108. Koplow, supra note 101, at 1231.
109. Lyons, supra note 97, at 810, n. 59; see also Schwebel, supra note 97,
at 302 ("The members of the General Assembly typically vote in response to
political not legal considerations."); HIGGINS, supra note 101, at 6 ("[V]oting
patterns to some extent conform to political pressures rather than to legal
beliefs.").
110. See David L. Breau, The World Court's Advisory Function: "Not
Legally Well-Founded," 14 MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 185, 201-02 (2006)

(observing that "Israel's opponents are generally able to muster a majority for
General Assembly resolutions condemning Israel," and that the General
Assembly "has a long history of singling out Israel for rebuke and excluding it
from participation in various U.N. functions."); Curtis, supra note 69, at 486
("Any realistic appraisal of the relationship of U.N. activity to international
law cannot discount the constant animus against Israel.").

111. Peter B. Rutledge, Medellin, Delegation and Conflicts (of Law), 17

GEO. MASON L. REV. 191, 197 (2009) ("Customary international law
derives ... from the consistent practices of states as evidenced in their official
statements, judicial decisions, international agreements and other diplomatic
actions.").
112. Guidelines on the Eligibility of Israeli Entities and Their Activities in
the Territories Occupied by Israel Since June 1967 for Grants, Prizes and
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reaffirmed "the non-recognition by the EU of Israel's
sovereignty over the territories occupied by Israel since June
1967... irrespective of their legal status under domestic
Israeli law,"" 3 and was accompanied by further statements on
the part of the EU reaffirming "the EU's longstanding position
that Israeli settlements are illegal under international
law . . . ." "4 Yet those statements, or any other statement
issued by the EU,15 do not suggest that in the view of the EU
the Israeli occupation is contrary to international law.
Therefore, international practice does not sufficiently
support the existence of a rule of customary international law
providing that a prolonged occupation resulting from a lawful
use of force may become illegal. Commentators advocating such
rule imply that the ICJ has missed an opportunity to address
this matter in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory.16 The Court, "while critical of both this construction
and the related settlement enterprise, and decreeing their
illegality, still focused on specific actions by Israel without7
questioning the legality of the occupation regime as such.""
The author
subscribes to the view that the silence of the ICJ is
1
telling.

Financial Instruments Funded by the EU from 2014 Onwards (EC), No.
2013/C 205/05, 56 O.J. 9 (July 19, 2013), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:205:FULL:EN:PDF.
113. Id.
1, 3.
114. Statement by the Delegation of the European Union to the State of
Israel on the European Commission Notice (16/07/2013), EUROPEAN
EXTERNAL

ACTION

SERVICE

(Jul.

7,

2013),

available

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/press-corner/all-news/news/2013/2013
1607 02 en.htm.

at

115. See e.g., Statement by EU High Representative Catherine
Ashton on the Expansion of Israeli Settlements, Brussels (Dec. 19, 2012).
116. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 38.

117. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 552.
118. Sabel, supra note 73, at 631 ("It is... telling that the International
Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Wall,
an opinion which dealt at length with the status of the West Bank, refrained
from characterizing the Israeli occupation as 'illegal."').
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IV. DO THE RULES REGARDING THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS
SUPPORT THE ILLEGALITY OF OCCUPATION?
A. THE OBLIGATIONS OF A STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR A
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The contention that conduct on the part of an occupant
aimed at prolonging the occupation may amount to de facto
annexation and thereby violate the right to self-determination
is hardly disputable. Such conduct possibly violates the

prohibition

on the

use of force

as well, 119 although the

application of jus ad bellum to determine the obligations of an
occupant in the case of a lawfully created occupation is not
entirely consonant with state practice, 120 and is likely to
increase existing vagueness in jus ad bellum. 121 But these

119. An amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, adopted by consensus in 2010, provides that "any annexation by the
use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof' constitutes an "act
of aggression." Resolution RC/Res.6, supra note 51, art. Sbis(2). Particularly
grave acts of aggression constitute the "crime of aggression." Id., art. Sbis(1).
Commenting on this provision, Eyal Benvenisti observed, "a question will
arise whether the occupant, which had seized control in a lawful war of selfdefense but refuses to negotiate withdrawal would have criminal
responsibility." BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 340. Benvenisti opines that de
facto annexation of the occupied territory "might pass the two thresholds of an
'act of aggression' and a 'crime of aggression."' Id.
120. Security Council Resolution 242 and other state practice seem to
suggest that the interests that an occupant may legitimately promote in
negotiating the end of occupation extend beyond security measures on the
ground. See infra notes 160-167 and accompanying text. This practice seems
inconsistent with the view that recognizes occupation not authorized by a
Security Council resolution to be legal only as an extension of the self-defense
exception to the prohibition on the use of force. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
121. Under jus ad bellum, any use of force that is not authorized by a
Security Council resolution must meet the requirements of Article 51 of the
UN Charter, which contains the self-defense exception to the prohibition on
the use of force. It is possible to argue that Article 51 is ill suited to govern
peace negotiations toward a political solution that would end the occupation.
The application of Article 51 to such negotiations is likely to increase the
existing vagueness of the requirements of necessity and proportionality in the
law of self-defense. Addressing the application of jus ad bellum to such
negotiations, Benvenisti suggests that "[i]n many instances ... it would not be
too difficult to conclude that there is, beyond reasonable doubt, bad faith on
the part of the occupant." BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 349. Benvenisti
recognizes, however, that "there is a fine line between reasonable bargaining
and obstinate holdout, a line that is very difficult to draw and one upon which
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violations of international law do not give rise to illegality of
the occupation resulting in the duty of the occupant to
unconditionally withdraw from the occupied territory.
International law recognizes the fundamental distinction
"between primary norms that define rights and obligations and
secondary norms that define the consequences of the breach of
primary norms."2 2 State Responsibility Rules are "a body of
secondary norms that sets out to explore the consequences of
breaching primary norms." 123 The legal consequences of state
conduct that violates the right to self-determination or the
prohibition on the use of force are thus determined by State
Responsibility Rules. 24
State Responsibility Rules require a state to first cease its
internationally wrongful conduct, if it is continuing. 25 This
obligation applies regardless of whether the unlawful conduct
is an action or an omission.12 It has been noted that "the
obligation to cease the unlawful act entails respect for the
primary obligation that is being violated. The consequences of
this obligation must therefore be determined by reference to
the content of the obligation being breached." 27
The violation of the right to self-determination arises from
the refusal of an occupant to earnestly negotiate the end of
occupation and from actions on the ground aimed at
perpetuating the occupation (e.g., enabling the settlement of
the occupant's nationals within the occupied territory). 128 The
obligation of cessation pertains to these unlawful conducts, and
entails a duty of the occupant to negotiate in good faith a
political solution that would end the occupation and to cease all
actions on the ground aimed at perpetuating the occupation.
there would sometimes be more disagreement than consent." Id.
122. BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 307.
123. Id. at 308.
124. See generally Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the

Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commentary,

53rd Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR
56th
Sess.,
Supp.
No.
10
(2001),
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9 6 2001.pd

f (specifying State Responsibility Rules and providing a commentary on these
Rules).
125. Id. at 88 (Draft Article 30); see also Corten, supra note 15, at 545.

126. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 124, at 88
(Commentary to Article 30, 2).
127. Corten, supra note 15, at 548.
128. BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 245-46; Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1,
at 579, 601-05.
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Such duties are by no means tantamount to an obligation to
withdraw from the occupied territory unconditionally.
Similarly, to the extent that a policy aimed at perpetuating
a lawfully created occupation violates the prohibition on the
use of force, the obligation to cease such violation does not
translate into a duty to unconditionally end the occupation. An
occupant that gained control over the occupied territory in a
war of self-defense may legitimately promote a range of
national security interests concerning the terms of ending the
occupation. 29 State practice does not support a construction of
the primary norms of jus ad bellum, which holds that an
occupant forfeits these legitimate interests if it also pursues
other, illegitimate ones, concerning the prolongation of
occupation. 3 0 The conduct that exceeds the boundaries of selfdefense and thus violates the prohibition on the use of force
consists of the refusal of an occupant to earnestly negotiate the
end of occupation and of actions on the ground aimed at
prolonging the occupation. The obligation of cessation pertains
only to these unlawful conducts.' 3'
In addition to the obligation of cessation, State
Responsibility Rules require a state "to make full reparation for
the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act." 32 The
primary form of reparation is restitution. 133It has been
observed that "It]he concept of restitution is not uniformly
129. See infra Part IV(B).
130. See supra Part III(B).

131. An analogy tojus ad bellum analysis that does not involve occupation
seems instructive. Consider the case of a state that has lawfully resorted to
war having sustained an armed attack. Any military operations undertaken
during the war by the attacked state, which aim to promote interests that are
alien to the law of self-defense, amount to a violation of the prohibition on the
use of force and generate legal consequences under State Responsibility Rules.

But this violation does not give rise to a duty of the attacked state to cease all
military efforts, including those necessary to achieve the legitimate ends of
self-defense. See, e.g., Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (2000), para. 33 (citing the view that "each use offorce
during a conflict must be measured by whether or not it complies with the
necessity and proportionality requirements of self defence') (emphasis added).

132. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 124, at 91
(Draft Article 31).

133. Id. at 95 (Draft Article 34); Christine Gray, The Different Forms of
Reparation: Restitution, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 589

(James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson eds., 2010) ("Restitution is
often affirmed to be the primary remedy in international law and this is the
position taken by the ILC in its Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts.").
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defined." 134 According to the definition adopted by the UN

International Law Commission, the obligation to make
restitution consists in a duty "to re-establish the situation
which existed before the wrongful act was committed ....
This definition does not support a duty of an occupant to
withdraw from the occupied territory where the occupation has
been established before the violation of international law by the
occupant. Restitution concerns the re-establishing of the status
quo ante that existed during the state of occupation and before
the wrongful act. Hence, an attempt on the part of an occupant
to de facto annex the occupied territory, a conduct that follows
the establishment of occupation, does not result in a duty of the
occupant to end the occupation, although restitution may
require the occupant to remove the consequences of actions on
the ground aimed at perpetuating the occupation (e.g., illegally
established settlements).' 3
A wider definition of restitution, adopted by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the 1928 Factory of Chorzow
case,1 37 states that restitution is the establishment or reestablishment of "the situation which would, in all probability,
have existed if [the illegal] act had not been committed." 3 8 This
approach to restitution, which could in theory support the duty
of an occupant to end the occupation in view of its previous
efforts to prolong it, was rejected by the UN International Law
Commission. 39 The Commission reasoned that this wider
definition would require engaging in an undesirable
"hypothetical inquiry into what the situation would have been
if the wrongful act had not been committed." 40 Such an inquiry
was considered problematic because of its speculative nature."
134. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 124, at 96
(Commentary to Article 35, 2).
135. Id. (Draft Article 35).
136. State Responsibility Rules recognize two exceptions to the obligation
to make restitution. Restitution is not required if it is "materially impossible"
or involves "a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from
restitution instead of compensation." Id. An inquiry whether any of these
exceptions pertains to the removal of settlements established by Israel in the
occupied Palestinian territory is beyond the scope of this article.
137. Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 47.

138. Id.
139. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 124, at 96
(Commentary to Article 35, 2).
140. Id.
141. Gray, supra note 133, at 590 ("The wider and more problematic

definition is that restitution must 'reestablish the situation which would...
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The ICJ has also been careful not to engage in this type of
hypothetical inquiries, and has never derived from the
obligation to make restitution a duty that cannot be supported
by the narrow definition of restitution adopted by the
International Law Commission.
Even assuming that the wider definition of restitution
represents customary international law, it seems that the
remedy of restitution does not give rise to a duty of the
occupant to end a lawfully created occupation. Review of the
interests that may be legitimately pursued by an occupant in
maintaining a lawfully created occupation and negotiating its
termination reveals that the occupant can legitimately present
substantial demands in negotiating the termination of the
occupation. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to
determine that the prolongation of the occupation resulted, "in
all probability," 42 from the violation of international law on the
part of the occupant.
B. THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF AN OCCUPANT
Some commentators have argued that international law
allows a state to occupy foreign territory as an extension of the
right to self-defense afforded to a state under Article 51 of the
UN Charter, 143 and that the legality of occupation is therefore
subject to the requirements of necessity and proportionality44
that delineate the contours of the right to self-defense.
According to this view, the interests an occupant may
legitimately pursue in maintaining the occupation and
negotiating its termination are restricted to those security
objectives that a state may promote in a war of self-defense. 45
Yet commentators have pointed out a substantial
uncertainty concerning the legitimate ends of war, that is, the
range of security interests that a state may pursue in a war of
"

have existed if [the illegal] act had not been committed' . . . but it necessarily
involves speculation as to what would have been the situation if the illegal act
had not occurred.").
142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.

143. U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.").
144. CASSESE, supra note 1, at 55, 99; BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 17.
145. Supra note 144.
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self-defense. 146 Some commentators have argued that the use of
force in self-defense must be limited to halting and repelling
the armed attack that triggered the right to use force, and that
the aims of war may not extend to the creation of permanent
conditions of security.147 Enzo Cannizzaro thus maintained that
the use of force in self-defense "must necessarily be
commensurate with the concrete need to repel the current
attack, and not with the need to produce the level of security
sought by the attacked state."48 This view has been criticized
as "removed from reality." 49 The prevailing view seems to hold

that "unless the armed attack is limited, localized, and
unconnected to a previous 'accumulation of events' or warthreatening situation," 5 0 the victim state may use force to
eliminate or at least significantly reduce reasonably foreseeable
future threats.5
146. David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and
Proportionalityin Jus ad Bellum, 24 Eur. J. Int'l L. 235, 239 (2013) ("All
accept that a state acting in self-defence may halt and repel an ongoing armed
attack, but there is a singular lack of agreement on whether it may also act to
prevent or deter further armed attacks from the same enemy.").
147. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 355 (2d ed. 2005) ("Selfdefence must limit itself to rejecting the armed attack; it must not go beyond
this purpose."); Enzo Cannizzaro, Contextualizing Proportionality:jus ad
bellum and jus in hello in the Lebanese War, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 779,
785 (2006).
148. Id.
149. Kretzmer, supra note 146, at 262. Observing the failure of the
collective security mechanism operated by the UN Security Council to provide
effective protection for states, Kretzmer submits, "[i]n these conditions it does
not seem reasonable to demand that the victim state restrict its response to
halting and repelling the attack, even when it has well-founded fears that the
aggressor may well mount another attack in the future." Id.
150. Id. at 270.
151. Id.; JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES

157 (2004) ("There is support for the view that the

legitimate aims of self-defense include the right to restore the security of the
State after an armed attack."); Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-Terrorismand the
Use of Force in International Law, THE MARSHALL CENTER PAPERS, No. 5,
Nov. 2002, at 20 (justifying the use of force in self-defense that is "no more
than necessary to defeat the armed attack and remove the threat of
reasonably foreseeable future attacks."); Stephen M. Schwebel, What Weight
to Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 344, 345 (1970). Yoram Dinstein argues that a
state that suffered a massive armed attack may use the force necessary to
secure complete surrender of the aggressing state. DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at
265 ("[A] war of self-defense - once lawfully started - can be fought to the
finish ....
Thus, notwithstanding the condition of proportionality, a war of
self-defence may be carried out until it brings about the complete collapse of
the enemy Belligerent Party."). Gabriella Blum suggested the possibility that
the evolving norms of the law of occupation now allow an occupant, which
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Linking the legitimate ends of war with
occupation, Stephen Schwebel has thus observed:

those

of

A state acting in lawful exercise of its right of selfdefense may seize and occupy foreign territory as long
as such seizure and occupation are necessary to its selfdefense. As a condition of its withdrawal from such
territory, that state may require the institution of
security measures reasonably designed to ensure that
that territory shall not again be used to mount a threat
or use of force against it of such a nature as to justify
exercise of self-defense. 2
Importantly, some proponents of the notion of illegal
occupation concede that an occupant may "use the occupation
as a bargaining chip" 15 3 in negotiating its termination, and that
"no ... claim of illegality would be proper as long as the
occupant's conditions for peaceful settlement of the conflict are
motivated by reasonable security interests." 5 4 This position
suggests that an occupant may use the occupation to promote
security interest beyond repelling an armed attack that has
already occurred.
Regarding the occupation of the Palestinian territories,
there is little doubt that Israel's most pressing security concern
to be addressed in negotiations to end the occupation involves
the potential rocket and missile threat posed by state forces
and non-state actors. The severity of this threat has become
apparent since the withdrawal of the Israeli military from the
Gaza Strip in 2005, with thousands of rockets launched at
Israel from the Gaza Strip. 5 5 In contrast with the Gaza Strip,
the West Bank is located in great proximity to Israel's largest
gained control over an occupied country in a war of self-defense, to insist in its

self-interest on the transformation of the occupied country into a democracy, as
a legitimate aim of occupation. This view clearly relies on an immensely broad
perception of the occupant's security interests. Gabriella Blum, The Fog of
Victory, 24 Eur. J. Int'l L. 391, 405-06 (2013).
152. Schwebel, supra note 151, at 345.
153. BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 245.
154. Id. at 245-46; see also Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 602
(implying that an occupant may use the occupied territory "as a negotiation
card to be returned in exchange for peace").
155. See, e.g., Rockets from Gaza: Harm to Civilians from Palestinian
Armed Groups' Rocket Attacks, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 2009), at 1, available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ioptqassamO809webwcover.pdf
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population centers as well as to Israel's main airport. The
emergence of a rocket and missile threat from the West Bank
in the wake of an Israeli withdrawal ending the occupation
would greatly jeopardize the personal safety of most Israelis,
and render a devastating blow to the Israeli economy and civil
life. As noted by Israeli Major-General Giora Eiland:
Rockets and missiles positioned throughout the West
Bank would easily cover the entire State of Israel.
Advanced anti-aircraft missiles would be capable of
shooting down not only large passenger aircraft flying
into Ben-Gurion International Airport, but also
helicopters and even fighter planes. Anti-tank missiles
that are highly effective up to a range of 5 km. can
easily cover not only strategic positions 15such
as Israel's
6
north-south Highway 6, but well beyond.

Because a substantial rocket and missile threat may be
posed by both state forces and terrorist organizations, an
agreement concerning the demilitarization of the future
Palestinian state would not suffice. As noted by Eiland, "[tihe
common denominator among all of these [types of missiles] is
the ease of smuggling and clandestine manufacture, as is
taking place today in Gaza. No monitoring system that may be
established will be able to prevent this. Only effective control of
the Jordan Valley... can prevent the smuggling of these types
of weapons." 1 7 Israel therefore insists on maintaining a
military presence, which could be reviewed over time, in the
Jordan Valley along the eastern border of a future Palestinian
59
state. 5 8 The Palestinians have so far rejected this position.

May an occupant legitimately pursue, in negotiating the
end of occupation, certain interests that extend beyond security
measures? SC Resolution 242 (1967) seems to answer this
question in the affirmative, as it indicates that political
measures such as a formal recognition on the part of Arab
156. Giora Eiland, How the Changing Nature of Threats to Israel Affects
Vital Security Arrangements, JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEFS, Vol. 10, No. 10, Oct.

26,

2010,

available at

http://jcpa.org/article/how-the-changing-nature-of-

threats-to-israel-affects-vital-security-arrangements/.
157. Id.
158. The Associated Press, Israel Could Reconsider Presence in Jordan
Valley, HAARETZ (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.haaretz.conmnews/diplomacydefense/israel-could-reconsider-presence-in-jordan-valley-i1.318887.

159. Id.
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countries of Israel's right to exist may be legitimately required
by Israel as a condition to ending the occupation. 160 The
language of the Resolution, which ties a withdrawal of Israel
from occupied territories to the "establishment of a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East," 1 ' further implies that the
occupant may legitimately link the end of occupation to the
settlement of disputes that are otherwise likely to trigger
future violence. A conspicuous example of such dispute
concerns the controversy between Israel and the Palestinians
regarding the claim of Palestinian refugees to a right of return
to the territory of Israel proper. The controversy surrounding
this claim concerns both its legal soundness and its
feasibility,12 and it is perceived to be "one of the major
stumbling blocks to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation." 163
Indeed, the position taken by Israel, holding that a withdrawal
from occupied territories must be part of a comprehensive
6 4
political settlement that marks the "end of all claims,"
including the settlement of the Palestinian claim to the right of
return, seems to have been
accepted by large segments of the
16 5
international community.
Yoram Dinstein has suggested that in negotiating the
terms of a peace treaty ending the occupation an occupant may
160.

S.C. Res. 242, supra note 74,

1 ("The Security Council ...

[a]ffirms

that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just
and lasting peace in the Middle East[,] which should include... [w]ithdrawal
of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; [and
t]ermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.").
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property
Rights in the Future Israeli-PalestinianSettlement, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 295, 312,
321-29 (1995).

163. Id. at 295.
164. Statement by PM Netanyahu on Address by US President Obama,
ISRAEL

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(May

19,

2011),

available at

http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoonm2011/Pages/PM Netanyahu US President
Obama speech 19-May-2011.aspx.

165. See e.g., European Union, Joint Statement by the EU High
Representative Catherine Ashton and the Foreign Minister of the Russian
Federation Sergey Lavrov on Middle East Peace Process (Dec.21, 2012), para.
1,
available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134
545.pdf ("The parties must engage in direct and substantial negotiations
without preconditions in order to achieve a lasting solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, ending all claims.").
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insist on the vindication of state interests that seem remote
from the sphere of security considerations, such as the payment
of reparations to the occupant by the sovereign of the occupied
territory. 166 The scope of interests transcending security
considerations, which an occupant may legitimately pursue in
maintaining the occupation or negotiating its termination,
remains unclear. Addressing the uncertainty concerning the
range of legitimate interests that may be pursued by an
occupant, Gabriella Blum observed that "ultimately, the only
uniform restraint upon present-day occupations seems to be the
ban on annexation."6 7
C. SUMMARY: STATE RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND THE
ABSENCE OF A DUTY TO END A LAWFULLY CREATED
OCCUPATION

The obligation of cessation of violations of international
law committed by the occupant during the occupation does not
require the occupant to terminate a lawfully created
occupation. Nor can such a requirement stem from the
prevailing, narrow definition of the obligation of restitution,
which requires a state in violation of international law "to reestablish the situation that existed before the wrongful act was
committed." 6 8 It seems that even the broader construction of

the remedy of restitution does not spell a duty to end a lawfully
created occupation. In negotiating the termination of a lawfully
created occupation, an occupant may legitimately present
substantial demands pertaining to its national security and
possibly to other state interests as well. Under such
circumstances, it is typically impossible to conclude that the
prolongation of the occupation did not result from the
occupant's pursuit of its legitimate interests, but rather from
the violation of international law on its part.
166.

DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 270 ("The treaty of peace may even permit

future return of armed forces of the (formerly) Occupying Power to at least a
portion of what used to be an occupied territory, in response to a material
breach of its provisions by the restored sovereign. Article 430 of the Treaty of
Versailles permitted such reoccupation as a countermeasure against
Germany's possible failure to observe its obligations in the sphere of
reparations. In the event, France and Belgium actually reoccupied the Ruhr
Valley on that basis in 1923 ....
").
167. Blum, supra note 151, at 405.
168. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 124, at 96
(Draft Article 35).
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Forms of reparation other than restitution (e.g., monetary
169
compensation) stipulated in State Responsibility Rules
clearly do not give rise to a duty of an occupant to withdraw
from the occupied territory. It appears, therefore, that State
Responsibility Rules do not accommodate an extension of the
notion of illegal occupation to lawfully created occupation.
D. STATE RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND THE "REASONABLE
TIME LIMIT" ADVANCED BY BEN-NAFTALI, GROSS AND
MICHAELI
Concerns
regarding the
circumvention
of State
Responsibility Rules also arise with regard to the "reasonable
time limitation" on the duration of occupation advanced by
Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli. This proposed norm turns
largely on the right to self-determination. 170 It has been
observed that:
[Tihe objective of the law of occupation, embodied in the
basic tenets elaborated by Ben-Naftali, Gross and
Michaeli-namely the vesting of sovereignty in the
population; the occupant's obligation of trust toward the
population; and the temporary nature of occupation-is
to safeguard the sovereignty of the ousted or
prospective sovereign, or, in modern-day parlance,
the
71
right to self-determination of the local population.1
The "reasonable time limit" provides that the illegality of
occupation results from the actions of an occupant that "has
annexed the occupied territory or has otherwise indicated an
intention to retain its presence there indefinitely." 72 Therefore,
the "reasonable time limit" is a means of ensuring that actions
taken by an occupant in breach of the right to selfdetermination (i.e., the formal or veiled annexation of the
occupied territory) generate legal consequences that adequately
169. Id. at 95 (Draft Article 34).

170. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text; see also Ronen, supra

note 1, at 208 (questioning whether the theory of illegal occupation advanced
by Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli constitutes a separate ground for
illegality, and submitting that the unlawful conduct giving rise to the
illegality of occupation under this theory "is ultimately a violation of the right
to self-determination").
171. Ronen, supra note 1, at 208.

172. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 601.
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safeguard this right, namely, a duty to end the occupation.
In view of its nature as a norm regulating the
consequences of state conduct violating the right to selfdetermination, the "reasonable time limitation" advanced by
Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli stands in tension with State
Responsibility Rules. Any violation of the right to selfdetermination triggers the application of State Responsibility
Rules. The discussion above demonstrates that these rules do
not provide that a violation of the right to self-determination,
manifested in actions of the occupant that amount to veiled or
overt annexation, gives rise to a duty of the occupant to
withdraw from the occupied territory. The effort to support a
primary rule of international law that provides for a duty to
end an occupation in view of conduct violating the right to selfdetermination can be viewed as an attempt to circumvent the
secondary rules of international law (i.e., State Responsibility
Rules), which determine the consequences of violating this
right.
V. LEX FERENDA: REGULATING THE LEGALITY OF
OCCUPATION IN THE ABSENCE OF TREATY
GUIDANCE?
Is a rule of customary international law, which provides for
the illegality of certain lawfully created occupations, desirable
as a matter of lex ferenda? I believe it is not, because the
application of such a customary norm would be heavily
burdened by uncertainty. Given the absence of any treaty-law
guidance, the illegality of occupation would have to be
determined on the basis of a case-by-case balancing analysis,
taking into account the right of the people under occupation to
self-determination on one hand and the legitimate interests of
the occupant on the other. Reliance on such balancing of
interests is problematic, however.
Customary international law is already highly vulnerable
to the dangers of uncertainty in the law. 173 Commentators have
173. Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and ForeignAffairs, 61 DUKE L.
J. 941, 996-97 (2012) ("Concerns about freelance lawmaking are greatest with

respect to the identification of customary international law ....
In many cases,
the ambiguous mixture of law and policy that pervades international relations
fosters doubt over the very existence of legal rules. The disordered, fluid
process for addressing these consequent doubts through judicial interpretation
only deepens and prolongs the indeterminacy. Even the evidentiary standards
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noted "the surprising area of uncertainty of rules in the body of
international law and the particularly grave consequences of
this in a system of law which lacks compulsory third party
settlement and leaves disputants free to rest on extreme
positions which tend to aggravate uncertainties still further."74
The indeterminacy inherent in balancing of interests would
further exacerbate the problem of uncertainty in international
law. 17 Therefore, international law appears to avoid the
balancing of competing claims in the international arena.

Commentators have observed that "although a balancing

procedure is often used in the context of U.S. Constitutional
law, there is no equivalent in international law and limited
authority for introducing
a balancing approach into
international law." 76
The scope of interests that an occupant may legitimately
pursue in maintaining the occupation or negotiating its
termination remains unclear. 77 Moreover, international law
does not provide any guidance on how such interests should be

weighed against the right to self-determination. The absence of
clearly articulated standards for applying the legal norm, that

could be implemented objectively, creates a high risk of

are unclear, for international law sanctions resorting to 'any relevant material
or source' in identifying the content of the law.")
174. Julius Stone, On the Vocation of the InternationalLaw Commission,
57 CoLUM. L. REV. 16, 38 (1957); see also Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo
Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 597, 606 (2002) (addressing the current state of customary
international law regarding the exceptions to the prohibition on the use of
force, Joyner observes, "Customary international law rules... suffer from
ambiguity, as they often lack sure existence and are interpretively unclear in
many instances. Any element of the international legal regime governed by
customary international law is therefore compromised by the inherent
uncertainty of the form of law upon which it is predicated").
175. See e.g. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: ExtraterritorialApplication
of American Law, 1991 SuP. CT. REV. 179, 221 (1992) (observing that
"balancing tends not to work so well in practice," because "[t]he considerations
being weighed are usually imprecise enough to permit several answers, and to
dictate none." Hence, "there is no greater certainty about the correctness of
particular outcomes--only more uncertainty about what these outcomes are
likely to be").
176. Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to
the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis Under the United
Nations Charter, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 326, n. 246 (1997); see also
Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("This court is illequipped to 'balance the vital national interests of the United States and the
[United Kingdom] to determine which interests predominate."').
177. See supra Part IV(B).
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arbitrary
and
politically
motivated
decision-making.
Uncertainty in the content of international legal rules prevents
them from providing meaningful guidance. 178 It has been
observed that "some elementary formal law-ascertainment in
international law [is] a necessary condition
to preserve the
179
normative character of international law."
Proponents of the illegal occupation approach avoid the
difficulties of balancing interests by assuming that a policy of
de facto annexation pursued by an occupant in violation of
international law precludes any further consideration of the
interests of the occupant. Having determined that an
occupant's behavior amounts to de facto annexation, they
immediately proceed - with a courteous nod to the occupant's
security interests 80 - to conclude that the occupation is illegal.
But nothing in the rules on which the illegal occupation
approach is based - the prohibition on the use of force and the
right to self-determination - indicates that the price of
violating these rules is the occupant's forfeiture of all
legitimate interests associated with the occupation, regardless
of their importance.
Proponents of the illegal occupation approach warn that
the alternative to such a norm is legal void filled by the catchall freedom principle 8'The latter is a principle of customary
international law - explicated by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Lotus Case 82 - holding that "when
no restriction can be authoritatively established, a state is seen
as free to act." 183 It is argued that the application of the freedom
principle to prolonged occupations amounting to veiled
annexation would
render "the very phenomenon
of
occupation.., excluded from a critical legal review. Such
exclusion is an invitation for excessive power." 8 4 In truth,
however, the absence of a norm determining the illegality of
occupation brings the freedom principle into play in a far more
178. Jean d'Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of InternationalLaw: A
Theory of the Ascertainmentof Legal Rules 29-30 (2011).
179. Id.

180. Ben-Naftali et al, supra note 1, at 609 ("It is beyond dispute that
terrorist attacks present a major challenge to the conduct of normal life. This
has become painfully evident in many parts of the world following 9/11.").
181. Id. at 553.
182. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 19 (Sept. 7).
183. Michael J. Glennon, The UN Security Council in a Unipolar World, 44
VA. J. INT'L L. 91, 98 (2003).

184. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 553.
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limited manner. A web of international legal norms pertains to
bad-faith conduct by an occupant aimed at prolonging the
occupation. As noted above, such conduct amounts to a
violation of the right to self-determination and possibly of the
prohibition on the use of force, both peremptory norms of
customary international law. Furthermore, bad-faith conduct of
the occupant aimed at prolonging the occupation is typically
manifested
in violations of rules of international humanitarian
85
law.
The void that concerns proponents of the notion of illegal
occupation turns on the alleged insufficiency of the remedies
currently provided under State Responsibility Rules, namely,
the missing remedy of an occupant's duty to unconditionally
withdraw from the occupied territory. One of the implications
of the freedom principle is that a violation of international law
subjects a state only to those obligations authoritatively
established under State Responsibility Rules. Commenting on
the freedom principle, Curtis Bradely and Mitu Gulati
observed, however, that "in situations in which it is
problematic to allow for such freedom of action, one might
expect that nations will have a strong incentive to develop a
treaty to address the issue."8 6 The absence of a treaty provision
requiring an occupant that attempted to prolong the occupation
to unconditionally withdraw from the occupied territory may
reflect recognition on the part of the international community
that such requirement is unrealistic - in so far as it entails the
forfeiture of essential security interests of the occupant - and
that its justness is far from self-evident.

VI. CONCLUSION
Neither treaty law nor state practice as evidence of
customary international law suggests that an occupant that
pursues illegitimate interests concerning de facto annexation of
185. The main manifestation of a policy of de facto annexation, the
establishment of settlements by the occupant within the occupied territory,
constitutes violation of international humanitarian law. See Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 38,

120; see also

Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 1, at 579-92, 601-06 (reviewing violations of
international humanitarian law on the part of Israel that amount to de facto
annexation of the Palestinian occupied territories).
186. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International
Custom, 120 YALE L. J. 202, 272 (2010).
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an occupied territory thereby forfeits its otherwise legitimate
interests concerning the terms of ending the occupation.
Moreover, although the veiled or overt annexation of an
occupied territory violates international law, the extension of
the notion of illegal occupation to lawfully created occupations
cannot be inferred from State Responsibility Rules. It appears,
therefore, that the illegality of occupation under international
law is restricted to occupations created as a result of unlawful
use of force.

